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TARGETS ANDINSTRUMENTSOF MONETARY POLICY
ABSTRACT
The notion of targets and instrumentsis basic to the conceptual framework
that economists hav used to bringeconomic analysis to bear on practical issues
of how central banks can and/or shouldconduct monetary policy. This paper
surveys the literature of targetsand instruments of monetary policy, focusing
primarily on the progression of analytical
developments during the past two
decades. The two issues that have been mostcentral to this entire line of
research are the "instrument problem" -- whatprice or quantity the centralbank
should fix directly through its open market
operations -- andthe "intermediate
target problem" -- whatrole (if any) the central bank should assignto
variables that it cannot set directly but overwhich it can exert substantial
influence (the most obvious example, of course,being the money stock). Other
issues that have figured prominently in
this literature include how best to
control money growth, should the central
bank choose to do so; the potential
role of money, credit, and other financial
variables as sources of information
that might guide the central bank's operations;
the implications of alternative
policy frameworks for the informationavailable to the economy's private sector;
the positive empirical question of determining
when and whether any given
central bank has actually based its operations onone kind of targeting strategy
or another; and the empirical basisfor making normative choices amongdifferent
targets and instruments. The surveyconcludes by drawing connections to some
broader issues, including rules versus
discretion and activism versus
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The desire to provide normative guidance to public policy is a fundamental
theme that has motivated much of monetary economics, almost since the inception
of the subject as a recognizable field of economic inquiry. The connection is
readily understandable. Because "money" in any modern economy is a commodity
either provided by government or, at the least, provided by the private sector
under authority and conditions set by government, the link connecting monetary
influences on economic activity to specific actions by identifiable public
institutions is immediate and direct. Investigating how those public
institutions' actions affect the principal dimensions of macroeconomic activity
has traditionally constituted the heart of what monetary economics is all about.
As long as some macroeconomic outcomes are clearly preferable to others --
stableprices rather than inflation, for example, or prosperity rather than
widespread unemployment -- thequestion of what government actions are more
likely to lead to more desirable outcomes is not just natural but inevitable.
The literature of targets and instruments of monetary policy has evolved in
response to the desire to bring monetary economics even closer to the actual
operations of central banks. Following the vocabulary made familiar in a
broader policy context by Tinbergen (1952) and others at the outset of the post
World War II period, research on the subject has proceeded from the distinction
between prices or quantities that a central bank can uniquely determine,-2-
directly through its own operations (the "instruments" of monetary policy), and
those aspects of economic activity that it intends for its operations, along
with other elements of public policy as well as independent forces, to affect
(the "targets"). In addition, because of the role often advocated in the
specific context of monetary policy for economic variables that neither fall
under the central bank's direct control nor possess social significant on their
own --theleading example, of course, is the stock of money or its rate of
growth -theliterature has also emphasized yet a third category of prices or
quantities now commonly understood as "intermediate targets."
The apparent practical importance of this line of research has increased
significantly during the course of the post-war period, as central banks around
the world have demonstrated their willingness not merely to change the
conceptual framework underlying their monetary policy operations but, indeed, to
do so in response both to abstract analysis and to the associated empirical
research which it has spawned. This process gained momentum in the 1970s, as
many central banks adopted different forms of monetary aggregate targets, and it
has continued in the 1980s as the growing disenchantment with such targets has
created a conceptual vacuum at the core of the monetary policy process in many
countries. At the same time, specific new questions raised by the application
of these ideas to actual policy operations have continued throughout this period
to provide fresh ground for new research, so that the interaction between policy
practice and policy research has been a two-way influence.
Notwithstanding this quite practical orientation, the literature of targets
and instruments of monetary policy also bears fundamental connections to a
variety of broader economic and political questions. Most obvious among these
are the issues qf rules versus discretion, and of an active versus a passive
orientation, in economic policy more generally.1 For example, having specific-3-
institutionalized target regularizes monetary policy responses to entire
categories of independent influences and events. Whether a target implies some
kind of rule even more broadly, however, and if so whether the rule is
necessarily simple and rrrnresponsive, remain open and serious questions. In
addition, as is frequently the case in debates of rules versus discretion
("government by laws versus government by men"), a motivation often advanced for
some kinds of monetary policy targets is to provide a mechanism for holding
economic policymakers politically accountable.
This paper surveys the major conceptual developments in the literature of
targets and instruments of money policy, with particular emphasis on the
broader, 'strategic" issues defining the overall framework within which policy
operates. The paper therefore devotes less attention to empirical findings and
to more detailed questions about institutional arrangements, both of which have
tended, on the whole, to be a good deal more specific to the case of individual
countries.2 Another limitation worth noting at the outset is that thispaper
focuses primarily on the analysis of monetary policy in closed economies.3
Section I examines "the instrument problem" --thatis, the selection of
the specific price or quantity which the central bank directly and immediately
controls --beginningwith the standard analysis introduced by Poole (1970)
comparing the relative merits in this context of interest rates and monetary
aggregates. A central issue that goes beyond Poole's demand-side-only analysis
arises, however, as soon as behavior governing the supply of goods and services
also matters in a nontrivial way. It is then necessary first to resolve such
prior questions as whether systematic monetary policy affects just nominal
magnitudes or also affects real economic activity, and, in turn, to determine
the appropriate objective to be pursued by monetary policy. Extension of the
Poole analysis to models including a role for aggregate supply behavior hinges-4-
crucially on such matters.
Section II considers the implications of the fact that whatmost people
mean by "money" in discussions of monetary policy is not a plausiblepolicy
instrument at all because it is endogenous in the kind of fractionalreserve
banking system common to most modern market economies. Hencemoney is at best
an "intermediate target" of monetary policy. Under what circumstancesis it
useful to have a monetary policy based onmoney -- or,for that matter, any
analogous endogenous variable --asan intermediate target? If an economy's
reality does not meet these conditions, is thereany other role for such
endogenous variables in the monetary policy process?
Section III turns to the subsidiary issue, which has beenof great
practical importance at various times and in variouscountries, of how the
central bank can best control a monetaryaggregate should it choose to do so.
In part the issues here are analogous to those thatarise in the Poole analysis
and extensions to it, but the literature of thissubject has also prominently
featured questions about the structure of the fractional
reserve banking system
which renders money endogenous in the firstplace. Such practical issues as
what constitutes the best short-runforecasting process, and what degree of
monetary control generates undesirable side effects like interestrate
volatility or even potential dynamic instability, have also beenimportant here.
Section IV reviews more briefly several specific issuesthat have also
arisen within the literature oftargets and instruments of monetary policy.
These include the implications of alternativemonetary policy frameworks for the
information available to the economy's privatesector, the positive empirical
question of when and whether any given central bank hasactually based its
operations on one kind of targeting strategy or another, and theempirical basis
for making normative selections ofmonetary policy targets and instruments.-5-
Section V briefly draws connections to some broader issues, including rules
versus discretion and activism versus nonresponsiveness, as well as to the
long-standing issue "why money?"-6-
I. The Instrument Problem
A central bank operating in a modern fractional reserve bankingsystem
typically has several different tools at its disposal for affecting private
economic and financial behavior. In most economies these include theability to
determine (usually within legislatively specified limits) whatreserves banks
and other depository institutions must hold in relation to theirdeposits, to
vary the supply of such reserves by buying and selling securities (usually
government securities) for the central bank's own account, to lend reserves
directly to banks, to set minimum conditions for particular kinds of credit
transactions (for example, stock market margin requirements), and toregulate a
- .. 4 variety of aspects of ordinary banking and other financial activities. Among
these several devices, the buying and selling of securities-- usuallycalled
"open market operations" --istypically the primary focus of the monetary
policy function.5
The "instrument problem" of monetary policy arises because ofthe need to
specify how the central bank will conduct its open market operations. In
particular, the instrument problem is the choice of a variable to beset
directly by the central bank via buying and selling securities, and hence the
value of which is to serve as the principal guide incarrying out that buying
and selling function. Becauseopen market operations are in essence a trading
activity, the instrument variable used may be either a quantity ora price. The
central bank may buy or sell a specified amount ofsecurities, thereby
inelastically providing or withdrawing that amount of bank reserves.
Alternatively, it may buy or sell whatever amount of securities other tradersin
the market want to transact at a specifiedprice, thereby elastically letting
"the market" determine the quantity of reserves to be heldat that price.
Beyond this more fundamental choice, of course, it is alsonecessary for the-7-
central bank to decide exactly which quantity variable it is setting (for
example, total reserves, nonborrowed reserves, the monetary base, reserves or
the monetary base adjusted for changes in reserve requirements, and so on), or,
alternatively, just which price variable (for example, the interest rate on
overnight interbank reserve borrowings, the Treasury bill rate, and so forth).
Whether to key open market operations to a quantity or a price is an issue
of first-order importance in normative monetary economics, and has been so for a
long time.6 The modern literature of the subject dates from the formalization
by Poole (1970) of the insight that the optimal choice between quantity and
price in this context depends both on familiar parameters describing economic
behavior and on the relative magnitudes of the different sources of uncertainty
affecting the economy.7 In the context of the instrument problem --incontrast
to the intermediate target problem, which is the subject of Section II below --
Poole'sanalysis related the choice between exogenously setting a monetary
quantity and exogenously setting an interest rate to the relative magnitudes of
the unpredictable elements of the nonbank public's behavior in the market for
goods and services and the market for financial assets, respectively.
Models Based Only on AEregate Demand
Poole's analysis relied on a simplified one-period Hicks-Keynes framework






where y is income; m is "money," supplied by central bank securities sales and
withdrawn by securities purchases; r is the interest rate (the price of the
securities bought and sold); u and v are zero-mean disturbances to aggregate
spending and money demand, respectively, with variances a2 and a2 and covariance
a; coefficients a,, and 2 are all non-negative; and all variables are in
natural logarithms, so that (with constant terms omitted) they bear the
interpretation of deviations from deterministic base values.8 Here disturbances
u and v reflect not only the stochastic character of private spending and money
demand behavior but also any other uncertainties due to influences on such
behavior from fiscal or other policy actions, changes in asset values, events
abroad, or any other factors assumed to be independent of monetary policy
actions.
The model consisting of (1) and (2) is prototypical of the vehicles used
for formal analysis of this kind, in that the number of solvable restrictions
exceeds by one the number of potentially endogenous variables, so that there is
one degree of freedom left to represent the choice of a policymaker. On the
assumption that the central bank's objective is to stabilize income around its
deterministic normal value, and that the values of all coefficients are known,
this model has the solution
E(Y2)j
(3)
when the interest rate Is exogenous, and
E(y2)I —fl2a+ - 2a12a
(4)
m +-9-
when the money stock is exogenous.
Comparison of (3) and (4) clearly indicates the nature of the trade-off
involved in choosing the instrument of monetary policy. Fixing the interest
rate --thatis, supplying money perfectly elastically -- shieldsincome from
any disturbances affecting portfolio behavior but provides no protection against
disturbances to spending behavior. By contrast, inelastically fixing the money
stock forces the interest rate to rise or fall so as partially to damp the
impact of disturbances to spending, with the extent of damping given by
o< 2
< but only at the cost of exposing income to disturbances to
+
portfoliobehavior. Given values of the three "slope" coefficients (and the
correlation between the two disturbances), a larger variance of disturbances to
spending relative to disturbances to portfolio behavior therefore makes the
money stock more likely to be the preferable instrument, and viceversa.9 In
the end, however, the choice is inherently empirical. Which instrument is
preferable, in the sense of delivering a smaller variance for income, depends on
the values of the two respective variances (and the covariance) as well as on
the values of the model's three behavioral parameters.
The choice of either instrument amounts to a rule requiring, at least for
the single time period under consideration, specified responses of open market
operations to the two classes of disturbances under study. From the standpoint
of the price of securities, money as the instrument means varying the price in
response to either form of disturbance, while the interest rate asthe
instrument means varying the price in response to neither. From the perspective
of the quantity of securities, the interest rate as the instrument means buying
or selling in response to either form of disturbance, while money asthe
instrument means -- subjectto the qualification below -- buyingor selling in-10-
response to neither.
Poole also demonstrated that, if the central bank is able to implement a
more richly structured response system, in general there exists a policy rule
that dominates either the simple interest rate instrument or the simple money
stock instrument. In particular, supplying money neither perfectly elastically
nor perfectly inelastically but rather according to a more general relation of
the form (again omitting the constant term)
(5)
for the optimal choice of -y1, delivers a value of E(y2) at least as small as
the smaller of E(y2)J and E(y2)I. The solution for the optimal elasticity
of money supply is
++ ll2'uv 1 — 2 (6) a +lv uv









The greater generality of the finite-elasticity response policy is readily
apparent In that use of the interest rate as a straight instrument (1l )
followsfor a2 —0(and of course then a —0),while use of money as a
straight instrument follows for combination: of values of a and a (and auv)-11-
for which —0.
Apart from these two special cases, thecentral bank's optimal policy
amounts to closing Poole's threevariable-tWO-re5triCti0nmodel by adding a
third nontrivial restriction, rather than by taking a uniquevariable as
exogenous. Morever, inspection of (6) showsthat, even apart from effects due
to the covariance of the two disturbances, it is impossibleto say a priori
whether this optimal response policy is to supply money with positive or
negative interest elasticity. The choice is again empirical.In intuitive
terms, the optimal money supply response amounts towhatever is necessary to
offset the slope and variation in money demand behavior, so as torender the
model's solved-out money market equilibirum as nearly interestinelastic as
possible --inother words, to produce a vertical LMcurve)°
The Poole analysis in this general form has proved highlyuseful in a
variety of different settings, including not just monetarypolicy issues but
such questions as fixed versus flexible exchange rates andnominal versus
indexed wages.11 The common features of this kind of analysisinclude the
relation of a policy choice to the relative variances ofdifferent sources of
uncertainty affecting the relevant aspects of economicbehavior, the dependence
of optimal actions also on key behavioral parameters, andthe dominance in
general of optimally structured constraints over simplyfixing one variable or
another. A key part of its contribution has been toestablish the inescapably
empirical nature of policy questions like thoseunder study here.
Supply-Demand Model itraI Monetary Policy
At least since the mid l970s, when the effects of priceincreases imposed
by the international petroleum cartel greatlyincreased macroecOnomists'
interest in many aspects of aggregate supply behavior, a major
thrust of the-12-
literature of targets and instruments of monetary policy has been to move beyond
a demand-only framework to models incorporating nontrivial representations of
aggregate supply. Extending Poole's analysis to a complete supply-demand
context is not straightforward, however. One reason is that doing so
immediately raises the issue of whether systematic monetary policy is or is not
neutral, in the sense of affecting only nominal magnitudes while leaving real
economic activity unchanged. Moreover, in models in which monetary policy does
affect both nominal and real magnitudes, there is no ready analog to the obvious
policy objective of stabilizing "income" in Poole's model.
For models in which monetary policy is neutral, Sargent and Wallace (1975)
demonstrated that the classic choice between money and the interest rate as the
exogenous policy variable is really no choice at all in that, with rational
expectations, prices in the goods and services market are indeterminate under an
interest rate instrument. A simplified version of Sargent and Wallace's model
expands Poole's IS-LM framework both by adding the representation of aggregate
supply behavior due to Lucas (1972, 1973) and by distinguishing between real and
nominal magnitudes for both quantity variables and interest rates. The





—it -2r + Vt (9)
—l
-Ei(p))+ x1+ zt (10)
where x now denotes j output and spending; p is the price level; r is
specifically the nominal interest rate; z is a zero-mean disturbance t-13-
aggregate supply, with variance a; E1
denotes the expectation operator
conditional on information as of time t-l; and allvariables are again in
logarithms, and all constants are omitted.
Because of the structure of (10), with its impositionof a "natural rate"
of output except for price misperceptions and the randomdisturbance z, any
predetermined nonstochastic value of mr thateconomic agents are assumed to
incorporate into expectations E1(.) affects
neither the expected value nor any
other aspect of the distribution describing x. Monetary policyis neutral.12
Money is a plausible instrument variable;but it affects prices only, not real
output.
By contrast, the model simply breaks downif the exogenous policy
instrument is not money but the interest rate. Inthat case, the model's real
variables are overdetermined, while there exists an extra degreeof freedom in
the solution for all nominal magnitudes. Both the pricelevel and the nominal
money stock are indeterminate.Unless prices are of no concern to policymakers
at all, therefore, the Sargent-Wallace analysis
indicates that the interest rate
instrument is not just inferior but implausible on an apriori basis. Unlike in
Poole's analysis, the instrument problem is not an empiricalissue.
McCallum (1981) subsequently demonstrated, however,
that this
indeterniinancy of prices under an interest rateinstrument would follow only in
the case in which the central bank's ultimate objectiveplaced no weight at all
on prices --whatMcCallum turned a "pure interest rate peg." Bycontrast, as
long as the central bank places at least someweight on prices in formulating
monetary policy, the model does yield adeterminate solution for all variables.
McCalluni actually showed this result for the casein which the central
bank's objectives include money, rather than prices, sothat the interest rate
is exogenously set as a linear combination of an arbitraryvalue (r1 in-14-
McCallum's example based on a preference for interest rate smoothing over time)
and the value consistent with any arbitrarily selected value for the money




where r is rt such that Ei(mjr) —mfor m arbitrary. It is clear,
however, that McCallum's result carries over to the case in which the central
bank's objective includes not just money but any nominal variable. For example,
a joint preference for smooth interest rates and stable prices, which would
again imply (11) where r is instead r such that Ei(p1r) —t-l'would work
just as well. At an intuitive level, the Sargent-Wallace indeterminancy result
simply amounts to the point that there must be some nominal anchor to determine
the absolute price level in any economy. Exogenously fixing the nominal money
stock is one way to provide such an anchor, but there are also many others.
Supply-Demand Models with Non-neutral Monetary Policy
Even in models based on rational expectations and aggregate supply ,behavior
that exhibits the natural rate property, systematic monetary policy may affect
real economic activity for a variety of reasons. Following the early
contributions of Fischer (1977a) and Phelps and Taylor (1977), the literature
has primarily emphasized failures of neutrality due to less than perfectly
flexible wages and/or prices. At its most basic level, the point has long been
familiar. An economy needs a nominal anchor to determine its absolute price
level, but it does not need two of them. Money can only be neutral if it is the
only exogenously set nominal variable.13
The immediate effect of introducing some inflexibility to either wages or-15-
prices in this context is to alter the aggregatesupply function. For example,
Fischer's equivalent to a reduced form for (8)-(lO),based on two-period nominal
wage contracts and assuming —1for simplicity, is
xt —m+ (e1 + e2) + E 1(eit -e2)+ E 2(e1t -e2) (12)
where e1 is the disturbance to aggregate supply expressed as
a function of the
real wage, and e2 is the disturbance tO aggregatedemand expressed as a function
of real balances (that is, a solved-out form of (8)and (9)) with elasticity
also assumed equal to one. Phelps and Taylor's equivalent,based on a model
with prices fixed one period in advance, is
—(E(p)
- + 2 (m - +et
(13)
where and 02 are combinations of the coefficients intheir model's
underlying behavioral equations, and e is acombination of the disturbances in
these equations. Still another variant that has figuredprominently in the
literature of targets and instruments of monetary policyis Beans S (1983)
— - E1(p))+ 2 Ei(z)] + z
(14)
where z is now the technological disturbance to anunderlying Cobb-Douglas







where - isthe wage elasticity of labor demand (in other words, where (l-4)
is the labor coefficient in the production function), and -3-—isthe wage
elasticity of labor supply. Yet another variant prominently used in the
analysis of monetary policy is Turnovsky's (1987)
Xt —'1
-Etl(pt))+ 2 Ei (z) + 73 Et (zr) + zt (16)







where- and are again the wage elasticities of labor demand and labor
supply, respectively; r is the extent to which wages are indexed to prices,
o r1; and E(z) indicates the contemporaneous perception of z, which may
or may not equal z.
Any of these supply functions renders monetary policy nonneutral, even
under rational expectations, so that further analysis of the instrument problem
requires a particular policy objective specifying the weight placed on real
versus nominal targets. Perhaps for that reason -- andalso perhaps because of
the widespread dissatisfaction with the results of using interest rates in this
role earlier on --therehas been little analysis in the literature examining-17-
the choice of monetary policy instrument at this level. Such an analysis is
easily possible, however, as an example based on the model used by Aizenmann and
Frenkel (1986) -- thoughcarrying out an exercise they did not undertake --
readilyillustrates.
In order to establish a plausible objective for monetary policy in the
presence of potential disturbances to aggregate supply, Aizenmannand Frenkel
based their analysis on maintaining equilibrium in the labor market





where w is the (logarithm of the) nominal wage, and z is a zero-mean percentage
disturbance to production for given capital and labor. If (18) representsthe
first-order condition derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function withlabor
coefficient 8, then — andthe quantity of output is
x —[6(p-w)+zI. (20)
The corresponding market-clearing equilibrium is invariant to the specification
of aggregate demand or to any disturbances affecting aggregate demand,of
course, but it does vary with z.In particular, 2d —1simplies
e
(w -p)-18-
—9( ) z (21)
—(1+9)()z
where the e superscript indicates equilibrium values)4 In the absence of some
specific impediment, the ordinary working of the labor market would establish a
new equilibrium at these values following the emergence of any non-zero
realization of the production disturbance z. At the same time, nothing in the
equilibration process represented by (21) anchors the value of any nominal
magnitude (wages w, prices p, or nominal income x +p).
Following Gray (1976), Fisher (1977) and Phelps and Taylor (1977), itis
useful to suppose that the impediment which prevents the automatic establishment
of the new equilibrium given in (21) is less than perfect flexibility of nominal
wages. In the limit, if nominal wages are rigid (w —0),then reaching the
equilibrium in (21) requires p —-() z If the model's demand side is as
in (8) and (9), and the zero-mean property of z implies zero expected price
inflation in this one-period context, then the monetary policy that exactly
delivers the price movement required to achieve the market-clearing real wage
despite the rigidity of nominal wages can be expressed equivalently as15
12) ___ m—v- u+ (1+ -—) - 1 z (22)
or
e 1 11+9) r ——u- j( ) z. (23)
a1-19-
Here the equilibrium movement in the moneystock accommodates any disturbance to
money demand on a one-for-one basis,fully offsets any disturbance to real
aggregate demand (with allowance forthe relevant elasticities a1 and 2' and
responds to the supply disturbance in justthe fashion necessary to deliver
p —- z.16The eilibrium movement in the interest rate does not depend
at all on the money demand disturbance,but it again fully offsets any real
aggregate demand disturbance (withallowance for al) and it again responds to
the supply disturbance so as to deliver p —.
-
e e
Clearly, implementing the monetary policydescribed by in or r requires
knowledge of the realizations of the model'sthree disturbance terms (only u and
z in the case of re). In the absenceof such knowledge, the choice that
corresponds to the classic form of the monetary policyinstrument problem would
be to fix either m —0or r —0,consistent with a zero prior expectation for
each disturbance. Either in— 0or r —0,however, delivers values of output,
prices, labor input and real wages thatwill then differ from the corresponding
market-clearing equilibrium. In order to evaluatethe relative merits of these
two policy alternatives in so rich an environment,it is therefore necessary to
have a well specified policy objective. For example,
if the sole criterion of
monetary policy is the variance of outputaround the equilibrium given in (21),
then the solution to the instrument problem hinges ona comparison between
2 2 2 2
(-l) a (-l)
E(x -x) —2 2+
2 u 2 v
in A A
c4
+1) 2a1 (+ 1)(9 +1) (9 +1)22 2
+ 2
- 2 +—— (24)
A A (4i + 8) (4' + 8)-20-
and
e 2











where A —a116ç8+2(a1+64))+a,,and for simplicity both expressions omit
all relevant covariance terms.17 Alternatively, if the sole objective of
monetary policy is to stabilize output around the deterministic (x —0)value,
rather than around the new market-clearing equilibrium value --inother words,
to avoid fluctuations in output, even in response to real production shocks --
thechoice between m —0and r —0hinges on the comparison of
2
(4)- 1)2
2 a (4)- 1)2
2a
+1)222
E(x) — a+ a+ a (26)










whereagain both expressions omit all covariance terms. Both of these sets of
18
comparisons are clearly empirical matters.
While there is no reason to presume that the stabilization of output per
Se, around either the ex ante or the ex post equilibrium, is necessarily the-21-
only criterion governing monetary policy, at least someother suggested
objectives amount to the same thing. For example,the policy objective
suggested by Aizenmann and Frenkel for their ownmodelis equivalent to
minimizing the expected area of a triangle representingthe welfare loss due to
disequilibrium in the labor market in terms of consumers'and producers'
surplus. On the assumption that firms are always ontheir labor demand curves,
so that 2 —2dregardless of whether that measure for this model is
—(1
-2e)[(w -)S(w -p)] (28)
s. 1 19
where (w -p)is the supply price of labor, equal to2 from (19).
For this policy objective, however, the solution to the instrument problem











In sum, the basic insight of the Poole analysis -- relatingthe choice of
instrument of monetary policy to the relative variancesof different categories
of disturbances affecting the economy, as well as to thevalues of specifically
identifiable parameters of economic behavior -- carriesover to models
incorporating nontrivial aggregate supply behavior, as long
as there is some-22-
contradiction of perfectly classical assumptions that prevents the economy from
automatically equilibrating on its own in the first place (and, at the same
time, renders monetary policy non-neutral.)2°-23-
II. The Intermediate Taret Problem
A potentially important problem inherent in the entire mode of analysis
reviewed in Section I is that what most people mean by "money" in discussions of
monetary policy is not a quantity set directly by the central bank. Under the
kind of fractional reserve banking system in use in almost all modern economies
in the western world, most of the money used by the public, either as a means of
payment or as a liquid store of value, represents the liabilities of private
depository institutions, Although the central bank can influence the
money-creating activities of these institutions, that influence is not the same
as its being able to set the money stock exogenously, as if money were a genuine
policy instrument. Instead, the quantity variable which the central bank can
set directly, if it chooses, is at best some measure of its own liabilities --
forexample, bank reserves or the monetary base (reserves plus currency).
One solution to this problem, of course, is simply to define "money' so
that it is potentially exogenous --thatis, to define money as some measure of
the central bank's direct liabilities --regardlessof common usage. In that
case "money demand" functions like (2) or (9) represent the derived demand for
central bank liabilities, based on the underlying fractional reserve system
(and, if the measure used is the monetary base, on the public's demand for
currency), and the analysis can proceed just as before. Nevertheless, this
confounding of the respective portfolio behavior of the banking system and the
nonbank public runs counter to the rich and long-standing tradition of distinct
analysis of money demand behavior (meaning that of the nonbank public) and money
supply behavior (meaning that of the banking system). In addition, keepingthe
two analytically separate in this context as well is more consistent with the
principle of distinguishing among the respective implications of disturbances to
the economy arising from different sources.21-24-
Merely extending the analysis of the instrument problem in Section 1 to
allow for the endogeneity of "money" is fairly straightforward. Following
Modigliani, Rasche and Cooper (1970) and others, a standard representation of
bank portfolio behavior that can be construed as either the supply of money or




where h is the quantity of nonborrowed reserves (or any other potentially
exogenous measure of central bank liabilities), and q is a zero-mean disturbance
with variance c2.22 The classic instrument problem is then the choice between
q
reserves and the interest rate, rather than between money and the interest rate,
as the variable to be set exogenously by monetary policy.
Combining (31) with (1) and (2) gives an expanded version of the
demand-only model analyzed in Section I, for which the solution is again as in
(3) for the interest rate instrument and








for the reserves instrument where aand a are the covariances of q with u
uq vq
and v, respectively. As in the comparison between (3) and (4), the advantage of
supplying reserves perfectly inelastically is to damp the effect on income due
to disturbances to aggregate demand, with damping factor-25-
+62) 0 <
2<• Theassociated disadvantage is that doing so
(a11 +÷
62)
exposes income to effects due to disturbances to both money demand behavior and
money supply (reserves demand) behavior, both of which a policy of supplying
reserves perfectly elast ally would eliminate. Similarly, combining (31) with
a supply-demand model like that consisting of (8), (9), and (18)-(20) would have
analogously straightfoward effects on comparisons like (24) versus (25), or (26)
versus (27).
By contrast, the issue that is not straightforward when money is endogenous
is what role money itself can or should play in the monetary policy process.
The intermediate target problem is the choice of just such a variable, usually a
readily observable financial quantity (or price), that the central bank will
treat, for purposes of some interim-run time horizon, as if it were the target
of monetary policy -- eventhough everyone recognizes that the quantity (or
price) in question actually bears no ultimate significance at all. Jhat it
means to base monetary policy on an intermediate target, and under what
conditions doing so is sensible, has been the focus of a substantial literature.
General Statement of Problem
It is easiest to understand the use of any given intermediate target
variable for monetary policy as a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the
central bank determines the value of the intermediate target which would be
consistent with the desired ultimate policy objective under a variety of cx ante
assumptions --forexample, zero values for all relevant disturbances. At the
second stage, the central bank proceeds, in some ex post fashion, to treat
achieving this value of the intermediate target (set ex ante) if doing so were
the objective governing policy. In practice many central banks have implemented-26-
intermediate target strategies at least approximately according to this
two-stage manner.
The distinction between the "ex ante" assumptions employed in the first
stage of this process and whatever makes the second stage "ex post" is clearly
crucial. Since the passage of time per se is not a significant issue here, the
literature analyzing the intermediate target problem has largely focused on the
availability of new information as time passes. The key role of the
intermediate target variable, then, is to provide a rule for processing and
acting on this new information.
Friedman (1977) suggested several plausible circumstances under which money
(or, for that matter, any other endogenous variable) may provide such useful
information. All arise in a dynamic setting in which a relevant value of the
intermediate target variable is observable before some policy decision, or some
adjustment to an earlier policy decision, is made, while the corresponding
value(s) of the variable(s) constituting the ultimate policy objective are not.
This realization of the intermediate target is then part of the information set
underlying the choice of a final value for the policy instrument.
The most obvious context in which this kind of segmented information flow
arises is an inherently dynamic system in which the relevant economic behavior
exhibits leads and lags distributed through time. For example, if people demand
money for transactions purposes, and tend on average to accumulate money in
advance of actual spending, then in general the observed value of the money
stock at any time conveys information about the future strength of aggregate
demand. Similarly, in models in which some individuals' or businesses' ability
to spend depends in part on their ability to borrow, and loan transactions tend
to precede actual spending, the observed volume of credit conveys information
about the future state of aggregate demand. In either case, such information is-27-
at least potentially useful whenever monetary policy actions affect economic
behavior with a lag.
An endogneous variable like the money stock can also provide such useful
information, even in the absence of behavioral economic lags, if there are lags
in the availability of relevant data. For example, in a context in which
disturbances to economic behavior are serially correlated, observations of the
recent values of key endogenous variables convey information that is potentially
useful for anticipating future outcomes. If observations of endogenous
financial variables like money (or credit, or interest rates) are available on a
more timely basis than observations of variables like income and prices -- asis
the case in most economies -- thenthe information given by those financial
variables in general has a role to play in setting the optimal value of the
policy instrument. Equivalently, if observations of financial variables are
available continuously throughout the "period" of analysis but observations of
variables like income and prices are not, and if it is possible for the central
bank to adjust the value of its policy instrument as time passes within the
period, then again these available observations in general have arole to play
in the policy making process.
Even so, finding that some variable like money conveys potentially useful
information is not the same as establishing that the central bank should
specifically use that variable as an intermediate target. Much of the
literature of the intermediate target problem has focused on analyzing justthis
distinction.
Intermediate Targets j Models Based QjJ Arezate Demand
Friedman (1975, 1977) analyzed the intermediate target problem in the
context of a demand-only model consisting of (1), (2) and (31),with serially-28-
correlated disturbances. For zero expectations of disturbances u, v and q,
whether the policy that delivers the smaller variance of income in such a model
is r —0or h —0depends upon the comparison of (3) and (32).23 In either
case, the potential role in this context for money, an endogenous variable in
either case, is to provide information indicating a likely non-zero realization
of some relevant disturbance, and therefore -- ifthis information is in hand in
time to react to it -- warrantinga different value of the policy instrument.
If each of the three disturbances u, v and q follows a first-order
autoregressive process with autocorrelations u' andPq respectively,
knowing the values of each of the model's three endogenous variables at time t-l
facilitates using (1), (2) and (31) to discover the values ofu1, v1, and
and then calculating "informed" expectations of the three disturbances for
period t as pu1 v1 and The optimal value of the policy
instrument for period t, given this information, is then
— ut_I (33)
under the interest rate instrument, or
h —-
a151[2 +utl -a1PvVtl + a1 Pqqtl] (34)
under the reserves instrument. By contrast, if observations ofm1 and
whichever of rtl or h1 was endogenous are available, butt-l remains
unknown, it is not possible to solve (1), (2) and (31) foru11, v1 and
and hence not possible to implement either (33) or (34).
Using money as an intermediate target variable in this context amounts to-29-
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where and 2 are appropriately weighted combinationsof all three variances
a2 and a2) and all three corresponding covariances,with a reserves
u v q
instrument. Hence under either instrument themodel breaks down in such a way
that targeting the money stock in this context requiresresponding only to the
information contained in m1 but not whichever of hi or rtlis endogenous.
The criticism of this policy argued in Friedman (1975)is that in general
neither (35) nor (36) is the policy that actually
minimizes the variance of
income, given the available informationcontained in the observations mtl and
either ri or hi. The policy that minimizesEi(y) is instead either
91pci +puauv 1
r—— m (37)






where and are analogous (though not identical) to and w2. Comparison
of (35) to (37) (or of (36) to (38)) shows that treating money as an
intermediate target of monetary policy does not in general deliver the
instrument value consistent with minimizing the variance of income, given the
information contained in lagged values of the endogenous financial variables.
Under special conditions, of course, the two may be identical. For example,
Friedman pointed out that if fl2— — 0--thatis, if money demand is both
interest inelastic and nonstochastic -- thenboth (35) and (37) trivially reduce
to rt —
a1
m1. In general, however, the policy based on money as an
intermediate target variable is not even the best way for monetary policy to
take advantage of the information contained in observations of money itself,
much less an optimum way of processing all available information in general.25
Intermediate Tarzets in Supply-Demand Models
For the same reason that they make the analysis of the instrument problem
so straightforward, demand-only models like the one used above offer only
limited possibilities for investigation of various intermediate targets of
monetary policy. Because "income" is typically the model's only endogenous
nonfinancial variable, and hence the obvious ultimate policy target, there is no
remaining nonfinancial variable to suggest as an intermediate target. The
choice of an intermediate target must therefore be from among the model's set of
endogenous financial variables.
Models incorporating both aggregate supply and aggregate demand behavior
also admit analysis of policies based on the use of some financial variable as
an intermediate target variable, although the literature has not pursued this
aspect of the subject in any depth.26 For example, making the money stock-31-
endogenous in a model like that of Aizenmann and Frenkel (1986) would merely
require adding a money supply function like (31) to the system consisting of
(8), '(9) and (18)-(20). The policy of exogenously setting m —0,analyzed in
Section I, would not then be feasible, but treating money as an intermediate
target variable -- thatis, setting either reserves or the interest rate such
that either E1(mIr) —0or E i(mIh) —0for any given information set --
wouldbe. Computing the resulting variances corresponding to E(x -Xe)2in (24)
and (25), E(x2) in (26) and (27), or E(A) in (29) and (30), would then be
relatively straightforward. The general inferiority of any such policy,
compared to the policy of setting either r or h at the value derived by directly
minimizing the ultimate policy objective, would emerge in a way that is
analogous to the result shown above for the demand-only model.
Analysis of intermediate monetary policy targets within supply-demand
models has instead primarily focused on the potential use of nonfinancial
variables like prices or nominal income. In this context too, it is crucial to
distinguish between analysis based on supply-demand models in which systematic
monetary policy is neutral and the contrasting analysis ofnonneutral policy.
When policy does not affect the distribution of real magnitudes, the price level
(or, equivalently, nominal income) becomes the only plausible ultimate
macroeconomic policy target. Hence the analysis of price or nominal income
targets in such models typically has little if anything to dowith the
intermediate target problem. By contrast, when policy does affect real
magnitudes, a price target for monetary policy is clearly anintermediate target
(unless real variables receive no weight at all in policymakers preferences)
and a nominal income target is also an intermediate target unless theultimate
policy objective also exhibits the one-for-one weighting system implicitin the
y —x+ p definition.27-32-
Aizenmann and Fenkel (1986), for example, analyzed both a pricetarget and
a nominal income target as if these variables were potential policy instruments
--thatis, on the assumption that either p —0or x +p—0in the model used
above could be set exogenously. They showed that, in their modelwith nominal
wages rigid, fixing nominal income is equivalent to holding employment constant
while fixing prices is trivially equivalent to fixing the realwage. Which of
these alternatives is preferable therefore depends on the relativewage
elasticities of labor demand ()andlabor supply (8) -- andof course, on the
objective governing policy. For the welfare-analytic objectivegiven in (28),
for example, the choice between p —0and x +p—0depends on the comparison
be tween
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so that the price target is more likely to be preferable if labor demandis the
less elastic, while the nominal incometarget is more likely to be preferable if
labor surnl.,y is the less elastic.
In fact, no central bank operating in a marketeconomy can simply set
either prices or nominal income exogenously. The feasibleanalogs to the
policies considered in (39) and (40) would therefore consist ofevaluating E()
-- or,for that matter, any other specific objective -- notfor p —0and x +p
—0but for the respective values of reserves or the interestrate consistent-33-
with Et —0and E1(x + — 0for a given information set in general
indicating nonzero expectations for the model's disturbanceterms.28
The principal contribution in the literature to date that has investigated
either price or nominal income targeting along these lines is Bean's (1983)
analysis of nominal income, based on the aggregate supply function given in (14)
together with the solved-out aggregate demand relation
x —' (m
-+ et (41)
where for simplicity "money" is taken as the exogenous policy instrunlent.29 As
in the analysis above of the demand-only model, the potential role for an
intermediate target variable here arises from the assumption of serially
correlated disturbances. Specifically, Bean assumed that each of z in
(14) and e in (41) consists of the sum of a random walk component and a
white-noise component. Bean also posited as the objective governing monetary
policy minimizing the variance of real output around the corresponding
equilibrium value in the presence of supply shock z, which for (14) is just
- — 11- Ei(p))+2(z -El(z))]
(42)
Given observations on the model's endogenous variables in period t-l, the
policy that minimizes Ei(x -x)2in the presence of rigid nominal wages is a
feedback rule relating m to the random walk components of z and e in period
t-l, but not to the corresponding white noise components. Either fixing the
money stock at m —0without reacting to this information or using nominal
income as an intermediate target variable --thatis, setting m so as to render
E1(x +PIm)
—0 -- isin general inferior to this optimal feedback policy.-34-
The resulting variances are
Ei(x -
x)2
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where is the minimum feasible value of Ei(x -x)2achieved by the optimal
feedback policy, and and a2 are the one-period variances of the random ji
ep zp
components of the disturbances to aggregate demand and aggregate supply,
30
respectively.
The m —0policy is inferior to the optimal feedback rule, therefore, in
that it always fails to take proper account of what is known about the demand
disturbance, and except when —Iit also fails to take proper account of the
supply disturbance. Similarly, although the policy of setting Ei(x + — 0
does eliminate the effect of the predictable component of the demand
disturbance, it too is inferior to the optimal feedback policy in that it fails
to take proper account of the supply disturbance (except trivially when —
whichfrom (15) implies an inelastic labor supply, so that supply disturbances
do not affect the equilibrium output level in the first place). Hence the
choice between these two sub-optimal policies rests on the comparison between
(43) and (44). Because a sufficient condition for the variance in (44) to be
less than that in (43) is ,< 1,and indeed the available empirical evidence
suggest a less-than-unit elasticity of real aggregate demand with respect to-35-
real balances, Bean concluded that monetary policy based onnominal income as an
intermediate target is likely to be preferable to a policy based on exogenously
fixing "money."31
West (1986), however, showed that this apparently straightforward
conclusion hinges cruciaLy on the choice of minimizing Ei(x) as the
objective governing monetary policy. As an example,West showed that when
minimizing Ei(x) is the policy objective, the conclusionin a highly similar
model is just the opposite. In that case a nominal income targetis preferable
to a fixed money stock if and only if the elasticityof aggregate demand with
respect to real balances is greater thanunity.32 The main point here,
therefore, is not just the inherently empirical nature ofthe key choices
involved in designing monetary policy but also, in a model encompassingboth
supply and demand, the importance of the choice of policy objective.
A further generalization of the idea of using either a price or anominal
income target for monetary policy is Hall's (1984) analysisof an "elastic"




where U is the difference between the actual unemployment rateand the
corresponding "full employment" benchmark, and thebase from which the
percentage price deviation p is measured (herenormalized to zero, as usual) is
specifically intended to be constant over time. Whenthe targeting rule's
elasticityequals the reciprocal of the elasticity relatingunemployment to
real income --thatis the "Okun's Law" coefficient (usuallyestimated
empirically to be around one-third for the UnitedStates) -- thiselastic price-36-
standard is equivalent to nominal income targeting. A larger value ofplaces
relatively greater implicit weight on unemployment (real output), while a
smaller value places relatively greater implicit weight on the price level.
Instead of making explicit the objective implied by (45) and working out
analytically the relevant variances that follow from implementing it under some
specific model, Hall performed simulations based on empirical estimates of the
time series of the respective disturbances to aggregate demand and aggregate
supply for the United States, and on an assumed value (one-half) for the
elasticity of the supply curve relating price setting to the level of
unemployment.
In a similar vein, Taylor (1985) used simulations of a bivariate
autoregressive process generating prices and real income, estimated using U.S.
time series data, to evaluate several different versions of a nominal income
targeting procedure. Taylor also explicitly considered, but did not simulate, a
generalization of this procedure analogous to Hall's elastic price standard. In
their reliance on empirical simulations rather than analytical solutions, both
Taylor's and Hall's analyses are in the spirit of the earlier empirical work
evaluating alternative monetary policy rules on the basis of simulations of
large econometric models.33 Nevertheless, generalization of the use of prices
or nominal income as an intermediate target variable to a rule like (45), with
its readily intuitive constant-elasticity form, is easily compatible with the
more explicitly analytical line of development of this literature in recent
years.
Th Information Variable Atrnroach
The repeated analytical demonstration of the inferiority of using some
endogenous variable as an intermediate target of monetary policy, compared to a-37-
more general feedback rule optimally relating the valueof the policy instrument
to the observed value of that variable, has shaped the subsequent monetary
policy literature in recognizable ways. It was readily apparentin work like
that of Friedman (1975) and Bean (1983) that the optimal feedback rulewhich
dominates the intermediate target strategy is a vehicle for exploiting the
information contained in observations of the endogenous variable in question.
Under such a rule, the endogenous variable is not an intermediate targetbut an
"information variable" in the sense earlier made explicit in a monetary policy
setting by Kareken et al. (1973).
The basic idea at work in the information variable approach is again
dynamic, arising in just the context discussed above,of either behavioral lags
or economic lags discussed above as the motivationfor the intermediate target
strategy. Observations of a variable like the moneystock are potentially
useful for anticipating future stochastic movements of variableslike income and
prices that enter the central bank's objective, orfor estimating
contemporaneous stochastic movements of thesevariables before the relevant
direct data became available. In either case, feedback ruleslike those derived
by Friedman and Bean constitute the optimal wayof exploiting that information,
given the assumed behavioral model and policyobjective.34
One implication of this "information variable" approachis that issues of
behavioral causation, which had dominated much of the earlierdiscussion, became
secondary.35 Whether the money stock does or does not "cause" movements of
future income or prices is not the issue here. All that mattersis whether
observed values of the money stock provide information that helpspredict future
movements of these variables. Hence statistical analyses alongthe lines of
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) are apt, despite questionsabout whether such
tests are capable of saying anything about economic
causation.36 In addition,-38-
Friedman (1984b) showed that tests of whether or not money provides such
information can also be performed within a structural model context.
Another implication of the conceptual shift from an intermediate target
approach to an information variable context is that there is no longer any
compelling reason to limit the focus of the central bank's policy setting rule
to only one such endogenous variable. In principle, of course, it is always
possible to employ some appropriately weighted combination of two or more
endogenous variables is an intermediate target. In practice, however, the
intermediate targets proposed in the literature have almost always been
univariate or, like nominal income, an unweighted combination usually regarded
as a single variable anyway.37 By contrast, under an information variable
approach there is no reason to restrict monetary policy to respond only to one
endogneous variable, unless there is evidence suggesting that observations of
that one variable contain all (or nearly all) of the available information
relevant to achieving the central bank's objectives. Instead, it is in general
optimal to follow the approach, intuitively outlined earlier on by Guttentag
(1965), of exploiting all relevant sources of information.
Friedman (l982a, 1983) explored along these lines the implications of
basing monetary policy on both a money stock variable and a credit variable, on
the basis of empirical evidence for the United States showing not only that
credit (defined as the outstanding indebtedness of all U.S. obligors other than
financial intermediaries) contains approximately as much information about
subsequent movements of income and prices as does any conventional measure of
money, but also that the interaction between the effects of credit and the
narrow (Ml) money stock is such that both variables together provide
significantly more information in this context than does either taken alone. At
an intuitive level, the principal argument here is that using a credit variable-39-
in this way diversifies the information base underlying monetary policy
responses to observations of ongoing events, in that credit describes the
liability side of the nonbank public's balance sheet while measures of money
describe the asset side. Subsequent contributions by other researchers
investigated further the potential role of a credit variable in guiding monetary
policy, relying either on empirical evidence on the relationship of credit to
macroeconomic variables or on theoretical arguments, along the lines of Blinder
and Stiglitz (1983) or Bernanke and Gertler (1986). In addition, Modigliani and
Papadernos (1983) developed a theoretical argument relating the relative
usefulness of money and credit variables in this context to issues of financial
market structure.
Like the optimal feedback rules derived in the various models considered
above, the information variable approach to monetary policy -- whetherbased on
one information variable, or two, or many -- makesexplicit the need for a
clearly articulated objective to govern policy, as well as a model statingthe
relationship between the variable(s) comprising that objective and thecentral
bank's policy instrument. Given these basic tools, the question of what further
role additional endogenous variables can play in the policy process is largely
an empirical issue of what (if any) readily observablefinancial prices or
quantities contain potentially useful information to guidethe setting of the
policy instrument in order best to achieve theobjective.38 At the same time,
the optimal choice of policy instrument is not independent of the potentialuse
of information variables in this way. Which instrument deliversthe smallest
variance for a given objective in a given model depends in general onthe
appropriately conditioned variances of the principal stochasticdisturbances
affecting economic behavior, and variances conditional ondifferent information
sets are not the same.-40-
III. Implementing Monetary Targets: The Instrument Problem Once Again
Notwithstanding the analytical shortcomings of monetary (or other)
intermediate targets as a basis for monetary policy, beginning in the 1970s,
central banks in an increasing number of countries adopted -- orat least
professed to adopt --monetaryaggregate targets. Given the endogeneity of the
quantities that most of these central banks meant by "money,"the issue of how
best to achieve these targets became a logical next step in the developmentof
the targets and instruments literature, indeed a step that antedated eitherthe
attention to supply shocks or the formal analysis of the intermediate target
strategy emphasized in Section II.
The separate literature of controlling monetary aggregates made clear the
fundamentally two-stage character of the monetary policy process based on an
intermediate target variable. Here the existence of a specified target value
for the money stock, presumably determined via some prior analysis involving
macroeconomic variables of genuine policy consequence, is simply a given. The
remaining question is how the central bank is to set its exogenous policy
'-strument so as to render the actual value of the money stock as close as
possible to this target value, in the context of different stochastic
disturbances affecting money supply and money demand. The fact that the
realizations of these disturbances will in general affect the value of the money
stock that is consistent with achieving the underlying macroeconomic objectives
of this policy -.whichis, in the end, the basic analytical flaw in the
intermediate target strategy itself -- wentunconsidered here.
Analysis Under Fixed Institutional Arrangements
Pierce and Thomson (1972) first explicitly framed the money stock control
problem in a conceptional framework analogous to Poole's (1970), also using a-41-
demand-only model like Poole's. More specifically, they examined whether
nonborrowed reserves or a short-term interest rate is the superior policy
instrument for minimizing the variance of the money stock around some given
target value when money is determined by the interaction of the money demand and
supply functions (2) and (31), with income taken as pre-determined but not known
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wherea is the variance of the forecasting error associated with y (and
covariances aand aare defined analogously).
vy qy
The result here is parallel to those derived above. Which policy
instrument minimizes E(m2) depends upon the relative magnitudes of thethree
relevant variances (and the covariances), and on the respective elasticities
describing the nonbank public's money demand behavior andthe banking system's
money supply behavior. The interest rate instrument exposesthe money stock to
money demand disturbances and to effects on moneydemand due to unexpected
movements in income, both on a one-for-one basis, but entirelyshields the money
stock from money supply disturbances. The reserves instrument damps money
demand disturbances and the effects of unexpected income variation,both with
damping factor 0 <2
2
2<1,but exposes the money stock to money supply
+-42-
disturbances. Which instrument is superior under these assumptions is an
39
empirical matter.
McCallum and Hoehn (1983) carried out an analogous investigation in the
40
context of the supply-demand model consisting of (8)-(l0) and (31). Here the
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As usual, the interest rate instrument
2 a1'1 J
exposes the money stock to disturbances to money demand behavior on a
one-for-one basis, and to disturbances to real spending and to aggregate supply
•ighted by the relevant elasticities. The reserves policy damps the effect on




1, but exposes the money stock to disturbances to money supply behavior. Which
instrument is superior is again an empirical question.
Analysis Alternative Institutional Arranzements
Although it is possible to think of numerous changes in the institutional
structure of a country's financial markets that might affect its central bank's
ability to achieve the objectives motivating monetary policy, the monetary
economics literature has not taken up such suggestions in any systematic way.41-43-
By contrast, suggestions for changing institutional arrangements so as to
improve the efficacy of the central bank's control over the money stock have
attracted substantial attention.
Given the fractional reserve system underlying the money supply process in
nearly all market economies, the chief focus of this attention has been the
structure of reserve requirements. Davis (1971) early on catalogued many of the
familiar slippages in the control of monetary aggregates via open market
operations, and Poole and Lieberman (1972) subsequentlyelaborated the potential
importance in the U.S. context of more uniform reserve requirements,both across
different forms of monetary liabilities and across different categoriesof
money-issuing institutions. Especially in the contextof the large realized
month-to-month (and even quarter-to-quarter) variations in U.S. money growth
during the 1979-82 period, during which the Federal Reserve Systempublicly
maintained that controlling money growth was its chief operating priority,the
specific aspect of this subject that attracted the mostattention was the
presence of a time lag in the requirementthat banks hold reserves based on
their deposits.
McCallum and Hoehn (1983) analyzed the implications of lagged reserve
requirements in the context of the supply-demandmodel consisting of (8)-(1O),




Because the moneysupp1y/reservesdemand equation does notaffect the
determination of the money stock anyway when the exogenous monetarypolicy
instrument is the interest rate, the substitution of (50)for (31) leaves-44-
in (48) unchanged. By contrast, under lagged reserve requirements the
corresponding variance when the stock of reserves is the policy instrument is
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Because the exogenous reserves policy in this context is equivalent to the
exogenous interest rate policy except for the addition of some slippage (2) in
setting the interest rate, it is clearly inferior in that it provides no damping
of the three disturbance terms in (48) but merely adds a fourth.
Under a system of lagged reserve requirements, therefore, the interest rate
unambiguously dominates the stock of reserves as the policy instrument for
controlling the money stock.42 Despite the unusual (for this literature)
emergence of a result that is not inherently empirical, the subsequent
literature on this issue has nonetheless largely focused on empirical questions
like how large the increase in variance from (49) to (51) really is, especially
in more fully specified and disaggregated models of money supply and demand, and
to what extent the use of the reserve demand relation (50) together with
macroeconomic relations like (8)-(l0) is consistent with the typically very
short time delay involved in most actual lagged reserve systems.43
Apart from the timing, coverage and uniformity of reserve requirements, the
principal issues of institutional arrangements discussed in the literature of
controlling money as an intermediate policy target have been the central bank's
discount window procedure for lending reserves to banks, responses to technical
factors like variations in float and currency in circulation, problems of
timeliness and accuracy of data, and the ever-present problem of seasonal
adjustment. Poole and Ljebertnan's (1972) early review of the subject-45-
encompassed most of these issues, and more recently Levin and Meek (1981),
Santomero (1983), Coodfriend (1983) and others have focused in particular on the
role of discount window borrowing.
Problems VolatilityInstability
Another set of issues that arises when the central bank uses some measure
of money as an intermediate target, especially in the context of reserves as the
exogenous policy instrument, is the prospect of excessive volatility of interest
rates. In simple models like those analyzed above, there is no apparent reason
why interest rate volatility should be a policy concern. In fact, however, most
central banks have historically sought to minimize interest rate volatility, and
it is not difficult to posit richer models of income determination in which
44
interest rate volatility can matter.
In a one-period context, interest rate volatility simply means the variance
of the interest rate -- or,more generally, of the entire constellation of
interest rates --aroundthe corresponding expected value(s). Here the
connection to the choice of policy instrument is clear enough. Under an
interest rate instrument, whatever interest rate the central bank sets
exogenously has zero variance in this sense. Under a reserves instrument,the
variance is nonzero. In the model consisting of (8)-(lO) and (31), for example,
the one-period variance of r when h is exogenous in general incorporatesthe
respective variances (and covariances) for each of u, v, z and q.Under most
familiar theories of asset pricing, this larger one-period variance for a
specified short-term interest rate implies larger one-periodvariances for other
interest rates as well.
In a dynamic context, the question is both richer and moresubtle. Here
the issue is not just the within-period variance of any interest ratearound its-46-
expected value but the movements of interest rates from one time period to the
next, including whatever deterministic component renders each period's expected
value not the same as the prior period's realization. Although the literature
has typically been vague at best in distinguishing these two senses of interest
rate volatility, central banks have typically exhibited concern for both.
Within the research literature, the empirical work of Tinsley et al. (1981) has
been an exception in focusing explicitly on interest rate volatility in both
senses.Whether interest rate volatility in this second, dynamic sense is
likely to be greater under an interest rate instrument or some other policy
strategy is not clear a priori. Using a reserves instrument, or using money as
an intermediate target, exposes each period's interest rate to a variety of
shocks as in the models analyzed above. By contrast, if use of an interest rate
instrument leads to increased variation in price inflation, and if realized
inflation affects the central bank's subsequent setting of the interest rate --
asis the case, for example, if the inflation rate exhibits inertia, and the
interest rate that matters for economic activity is the real interest rate --
thenthe period-to-period variance of (nominal) interest rates may be greater
under an interest rate instrument. More generally, any monetary policy system
that results in a volatile inflation rate is likely to increase the
period-to-period volatility of nominal interest rates.
Finally, in a dynamic context the extent of period-to-period interest rate
volatility also depends on the objective specifying how rapidly the central bank
seeks to restore income (or prices, or money) to the corresponding targeted
path, once a departure from that path has occurred. The point at issue here is
a straightforward application of Holbrook's (1972) analysis of the problem of
instrument instability, which can arise whenever the effects of policy
instruments on policy targets are distributed through time. Ciccolo (1974),-47-
Enzler and Johnson (1981), Freedman (1983) and others have analyzed the
potential instability that can result from excessively close control of a money
target, given the extensive evidence indicating that money demand behavior
exhibits a lagged response to interest rates.45 The point is presumably
applicable in a broader context as well, given the even more substantial
evidence documenting lags in the response of nonfinancial behavior to movements
in financial prices and quantities.-48-
IV.OtherIssues
In addition to the central analytical issues reviewed in Sections I, II and
III, the literature of targets and instruments of monetary policy has also
encompassed a variety of specific related questions. The most prominent among
these include the implications of the central bank's operating procedures for
the behavior of the private sector, positive questions about whether central
banks did or did not in fact use a particular operating procedures during a
particular time period (a question often taken up in the context of a central
bank's own public assertion that it did so), and the voluminous empirical
literature examining which financial quantities best display the properties
appropriate for a monetary policy target.
Monetatary Policy and Private Information
A central theme running throughout the targets and instruments literature,
and especially in the analysis of the intermediate target problem as laid out in
Section II, is the central bank's exploitation of available information. At the
ame time, however, it should be clear that the structure of the policy process
-- whatpotential instrument variable is exogenous, what (if any) intermediate
target variable provides the basis for automatic responses of the instrument,
and so on --alsoaffects the information available to the economy's private
sector. To the extent that that is so, holding private-sector behavior fixed
for purposes of analysis like that above is potentially misleading.46
Dotsey and King (1986), building on King's (1982, 1983) earlier work,
reconsidered Poole's (1970) original evaluation of interest rate versus money
stock instruments in the context of a model in which private-sector decision
makers learn from observing market prices, including nominal interest rates, and
in which inadequacies of information are by assumption the only impediment to-49-
47
achieving the equilibrium level of output. Their analysis shows that an
interest rate target rule, by which the central bank uses a feedback rule to set
Ei(r) on the basis of observed economic outcomes in period t-l, but then
allows disturbances to the economy to affect the corresponding actual
realization rt, is equivalent to a feedback rule similarly relating the value of
the money stock to observed economic outcomes. Dotsey and King also showed that
in their model either of these feedback rules in general dominates either a
fixed interest rate policy or a fixed money stock policy, so that the analogy to
Poole's original result is even more complete.
Siegel (1985) used a much simpler model, again incorporating flexible
prices, to consider what properties make a monetary aggregate a useful
"indicator" of unobservable variables like income and prices. As in Dotsey and
King's work, but in contrast to the line of analysis in Sections I-Ill, the
presumption is that with full information the private economy on its own will
operate at equilibrium, so that the purpose of variables that provide
information is to facilitate this private-sector process rather than to enable
the central bank to assist the private sector in reaching equilibrium. Siegel
showed that monetary assets with demands that are jincomeelastic in general
provide the most information about both prices and real income, while monetary
assets with demands that are highly income elastic provide the most information
about nominal income. Siegel also emphasized the more familiar point that
monetary assets that are extremely closely related to the reserve base provide
little information about any endogenous variables when the central bank uses
reserves as its exogenous policy instrument. Both of these conclusions are
especially relevant in the context of the empirical literature discussed below.
Moreover, Siegel's conclusions are also favorable to simultaneously using more
than one aggregate as information variables, along the lines discussed in-50-
Section II.
What the Central Bank Did or Didn't Do
The adoption of at least some form of monetary target for monetary policy
became widespread during the 1970s -- atleast according to what central banks
said about their own policies. By contrast, economists and other observers of
monetary policy (both official and private) have often expressed doubts that
some central banks' adoption of such targets was more than rhetorical. Most
often, skepticism of this kind has ensued when an announced policy based on a
monetary aggregate target did not deliver the results previously claimed in
behalf of such a policy by its advocates. A logical question in that case is
whether the policy was unsuccessful or, alternatively, was simply never tried.
This issue became especially lively in the United States in the wake of the
emphasis on monetary aggregate targets which the Federal Reserve System
officially said it adopted in 1979 and abandoned in 1982.48
An early contribution along these lines was DeRosa and Stern's (1977)
e'fort to establish whether the Federal Reserve System had adopted (at least in
part) a monetary aggregate target in 1970. Their analysis, which largely set
the pattern for future efforts along these line, involved empirically estimating
a central bank reaction function of the form
—t-l
-t-l'X.1) (52)
where r is the change in the interest rate used as the exogenous policy
instrument, iN is the growth rate of whatever monetary aggregate is in question
as the supposed intermediate policy target, tM* is the corresponding announced
target value, andis a vector of other variables (like price inflation or-51-
unemployment) to which monetary policy may plausibly respond.49 Addressing the
question of the adoption of a monetary target as of a specific date then amounts
to testing for a change in the reaction function coefficients, in particular the
coefficient on the (M -M*)term, at that point in the data sample. DeRosa
and Stern reported statistically significant evidence of such a change for the
United States in 1970.
The subsequent literature has evolved along roughly the same lines.
Prominent examples for the U.S. case are tests by Feige and McGee (1979) and by
Lombra and Moran (1980) for Federal Reserve behavior following the 1975 adoption
of a Congression resolution calling for monetary aggregate targets, and by Hoehn
(1983) for Federal Reserve behavior during the controversial 1979-82 period. In
each case, the evidence again indicated a statistically significant change at
the time indicated.
As Lombra and Moran emphasized, however, statistical significance and
economic significance are not always the same. In their results, for example,
the post-1975 response of the federal funds rate to observed deviations of money
growth from the corresponding target value was statistically significant, but so
small (compared to the benchmark provided by empirical estimates of the interest
elasticity of money demand) as to cast doubt on how large a role the monetary
target actually played in the Federal Reserve System's decisions setting
interest rates. This point has featured prominently in the subsequent
literature, especially since empirical estimates almost always indicate a very
small (in absolute value) interest elasticity of money demand in the short run,
so that a correspondingly large response of interest rates to observed movements
in the money stock would be necessary to correct such movements within any short
time frame.-52-
Evidence Comoarinz Alternative Target Variables
One of the most troublesome contrasts between the world described by simple
models like those surveyed throughout this paper and the world in which actual
central banks make monetary policy is the multiplicity (in the latter) of
different deposit instruments, and hence the multiplicity of different monetary
aggregates. Before it can take advantage of the insights of a typical model
including a single variable labeled "M" and called "money," therefore, a central
bank operating in any well developed financial system must decide just which
variable "M" is. Moreover the experience of many countries has now cast strong
doubt on the proposition, sometimes offered as a way of minimizing the
importance of this choice, to the effect that all of the potential "M's"
typically move together anyway. That may be so in the context of a
hyperinflation, but in countries experiencing ordinary business fluctuations
under moderate inflation different "M's" often display widely disparate growth
rates, even for periods of several years at a time. Hence even saying whether
monetary policy is tight or easy, or has tightened or eased, often depends
crucially on which deposit aggregate is construed as "money."
The approach that the literature has ta1en to this question is primarily
empirical, and the resulting body of available empirical research is both large
and extensive, covering different time periods and different countries and
employing a variety of statistical methodologies. Although it is not the
purpose of this paper to survey this empirical literature in any detail, it is
us 1 nonetheless to indicate how its main strands relate to the analytical
issues discussed in Sections IIII.
By far the greatest part of this empirical research, and the part with the
longest history, has investigated the connection between alternative financial
aggregates and macroeconomic variables plausibly construed as defining the-53-
ultimate objectives of monetary policy. The earlier efforts along these lines
primarily employed the statistical methodology that grew out of the work of
Friedman and Meiselman (1963) and Andersen and Jordan (1968). The question
usually asked in this line of research is which aggregate delivers the best
"fit" when employed as K in equations of the form
—
1"it-i' X1) (53)
where Y is the growth rate of nominal income, N is the growth rate of the
aggregate, X is a vector of other variables affecting Y (frequently used
elements of X include a fiscal policy measure and a dummy variable indicating
major labor union strikes), and the w. are a set of distributed lag weights to
be estimated. Following the work of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972), however,
the question more typically asked has become not just whether some K can predict
the future variation of Y but, more specifically, whether K can predict that
part of the variation in Y not already predictable from the observed movement of





where the are distributed lag coefficients analogous to the
Empirical research along the lines of either (53) or (54) bears a fairly
direct relation to the analytical issues under discussion in Sections I-Ill. In
either case, the object is to find the aggregate that, if employed by the
central bank as its intermediate target variable in the case of deposit or loan-54-
aggregates that are necessarily endogenous, or if employed as the exogenous
policy instrument in the case of aggregates like nonborrowed reserves or the
monetary base, would deliver a smaller variance of income about its expected
value. Further, the recognition that nominal income may be less relevant than
real income and prices separately in defining the ultimate objective of monetary
policy has often led to trivariate (and sometimes higher-order) generalizations
of (54), with separate equations for real income and prices, respectively.
An even more traditional line of empirical work that some researchers have
also brought to bear on the selection of an aggregate for monetary policy
purposes is the estimation of money demand functions. Here the connection to
the analytical issues considered in Sections I-Ill is even more straightforward.
While equations like (53) or (54) at best represent reduced-form solutions to
the models that typically underlie the analytical side of this literature,
empirical money demand functions are, in principle, direct implementations of
equations like (9) which are clearly central to the analysis. Consequently,
empirical estimation of money demand functions can provide values of such
crucial behavioral parameters as elasticities and and variance in (9).
Especially in the wake of the trend toward deregulation and private innovation
in the financial markets of many countries, the literature of empirically
estimated money demand functions has grown enormously in recent years.5'
There has also been a substantial amount of empirical research focusing on
the relationship between alternative monetary aggregates and variables that
comprise potential exogenous instruments of monetary policy. Here what is at
issue is the monetary control problem, as outlined in Section III, and the
connection to the underlying analytical issues is typically both direct and
explicit. Much of the work along these lines has exploited empirical models of
money demand and money supply to estimate the variance that would be associated-55-
with the use of a specific instrument variable (for example, nonborrowed
reserves or the federal funds rate) to affect a given endogenous monetary
aggregate used as an intermediate target variable.52 An alternative approach,
employed by Johannes and Rasche (1979), is to use time-series methods to
estimate what amounts to a reduced-form equivalent of such models.
Two specific aspects common to all three of these lines of empirical
research bear explicit comment as they relate to the literature of targets and
instruments of monetary policy. First, whether or not "money" exhibits
properties that bear implications for choosing a particular monetary policy
framework is increasingly not an independently testable question, at least on
the basis of historical data, because central banks can and do use the results
of statistical studies like those described above as a basis for deciding how to
define "money" in the first place.53 Second, a striking feature of this entire
field of empirical investigation is the remarkable extent to which researchers
who otherwise profess strong sympathy with Lucas' (1976) criticism of the use of
econometric models for policy purposes, on the ground that a change in policy
procedures will in general induce a change in economic behavior and will
therefore invalidate the model, have simply ignored this criticism as it applies
to these kinds of exercises as a basis for selecting the best "M".-56-
V.Some Broader Issues
In conclusion it is also useful to consider briefly the relationship
between the main line of analytical issues developed in the targets and
instruments literature and some other broad issues involved in the conduct of
monetary policy. The most obviously relevant among these are the traditional
issues of rules versus discretion, and of activism versus nonresponsiveness, in
the making of economic policy more genearally.54
In a single-period context, the entire subject of targets and instruments
of monetary policy falls squarely into the general discussion of rules for
guiding policy. In this sense the choice of an exogenous policy instrument, and
in some cases also of an intermediate policy target, amounts to picking a rule
for determining how the economic system -- hereincluding the actions of the
central bank -- willtranslate the various disturbances to which the economy is
subject into effects on its overall performance. Some of these implied rules
are simple. Others, including feedback rules of the kind derived in Section II,
are more complicated. In the end, however, within the context of a single
oeriod each is a rule nonetheless.
Following the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983), however, the modern literature of rules versus discretion is mostly
about what happens in a dynamic context, and here the connection to the targets
and instruments literature is less straightforward. Is the central bank
presumed to make the same choice of instrument variable (and intermediate target
variable, if any) in each period? Whataspectsof the economy's condition
inherited from the previous period does it take into account in defining the
objective which motivates its actions in each period? What kind of feedback
rules does it employ in relating the value of its instrument (and its
intermediate target, if any) to those conditions? In what way does its-57-
objective take account of the implications of its current actions for future
time periods?The relationship between the issues reviewed in Sections I-Ill
and the rules versus discretion debate hinges importantly on the answers to
questions like these.
One line of thinking that implicitly addresses many of these questions,
clearly articulated by Tobin (1983), for example, is that in the world of actual
policymaking "rules" necessarily mean simple rules. In that case the analytical
issues reviewed in this paper do bear quite directly on the rules versus
discretion debate, since the typical outcome of the line of analysis surveyed
here is to demonstrate the inferiority in general of simple rules -- fixthe
reserve base, fix an interest rate, fix the expected value of the money stock,
and so on -- comparedto rules specifying responses that take account of at
least some of the available information about the disturbances affecting
economic behavior. If rules must be simple ones, therefore, the targets and
instruments literature not only demonstrates the qualitative inferiority of
rules but provides guidelines for quantifying that inferiority. Nevertheless,
the issue remains open, not only because of questions about the empirical
magnitudes involved but also because others who have thought about these issues
--forexample, MeCallum (1985) -- rejectthe view that rules must be simple in
orderto be practically relevant.
The literature of targets and instruments of monetary policy is also
closely related to the issue of activism versus nonresponsiveneSs.
Nonresponsiveness essentially means a simple rule -- fixthis, or fix that --
whileactivism means responding to initial conditions, or to evidence of
disturbances, according to one feedback rule or another. Even so, because the
nonresponsive rules that have attracted the most attention over the yearshave
typically referred to some endogenous variable like money, rather than to some-58-
variable that the central bank can set directly (like nonborrowed reserves), in
the end the real question is not whether or not to respond to anything atall
but rather which classes of phenomena merit a response and which do not. This
kind of question is clearly at the analytical heart of the targets and
instruments literature surveyed in Sections I-Ill.
Framing the issue in this way also makes clear the limited applicabilityof
Friedman's (1953) classic criticism of activist policy on the ground that
varying policy from the no-response, or base, position in generalintroduces
uncertainty, and with sufficient ignorance may introduce sufficient uncertainty
to increase the variance of the policy objective rather than reduce it. The
targets and instruments literature brings to center attention the problemof
defining the base position in the first place in a stochastic environment. Does
it refer to an interest rate, to the reserve base, or to money? Does it refer
to levels or to changes of whatever variable is at issue?
Analysis along the lines of the targets and instruments literature
indicates how to answer such questions on the basis of any given model, and
typically any given model will imply that in general at least some degree of
responsiveness dominates a purely nonresponsive policy, even after allowing for
uncertainty surrounding the model's coefficients as illustrated by Brainard
(1967). Although many economists have argued as if an even deeper level of
uncertainty -- inparticular, ignorance about what is the right model -- somehow
implies that fixing some measure of money constitutes the appropriate definition
of the base position for purposes of this issue, there is no obvious reason to
accept this presumption. In the absence of at least some articulated model
indicating the likely implications of the central bank's policy actions for its
policy objectives, no conclusions of this kind are possible at all. There is no
more reason for presuming that qualitative propositions about "money" uniquely-59-
survive the absence of a model than for the presumption that empirical evidence
involving "money" uniquely survives Lucas (1976) point about public policy and
private behavior.
Finally, although it is easy enough as a matter of abstract analysis to
discuss all of these aspects of monetary policy as if "policy" and "politics"
did not have the same root, political considerations are hardly irrelevant to
the issues involved in the targets and instruments literature. A frequently
expressed motivation underlying the intermediate target strategy -- articulated
by Poole (1980), for example --isto provide a mechanism enabling higher
governmental authorities as well as the general public to hold the central bank
politically accountable for its conduct of monetary policy. Whether this
argument is compelling must in the end depend both upon the quantitative degree
of inferiority of the intermediate target strategy compared to a given
alternative, determined along the lines analyzed here, and on the risks and
consequences associated with the relevant central bankdecision makers may do in
the absence of such an accountability mechanism. That these risks and
consequences are difficult to specify does not necessarilymake them less real.
At least thus far, however, this difficulty has largely prevented the
development of any substantial body of monetary policy research incorporating
them.-60-
Footnotes
*This paper was prepared for the Handbook Q. Monetary Economics (B.M.
Friedman and F. Hahn, eds.), North-Holland Publishing Company, forthcoming. I
am grateful to Alan Viard for research assistance, and to the National Science
Foundation and the Harvard Program for Financial Research for research support.
1. See the treatment of rules versus discretion in Stanley Fischer's
contribution to this Handbook.
2. See, for example, the useful surveys by Cagan (1982) and McCallum (1985),
and the more recent references cited in Friedman and Kuttner (1988)
3. See the treatment of monetary policy in open economies in Rudiger Dornbusch
and Alberto Giovannini's contribution to this Handbook.
4.Throughout the remainder of this paper, "banks" will be taken to include
all financial intermediaries making loans and taking deposits subject to
reserve requirements set by the central bank or a parallel regulatory body.
5. In some countries, direct lending of reserves --the"discount window' --
isalso of substantial importance. More typically, however, variations in
discount policy are considered significant largely to the extent that they
are signals of intended future open market operations. See Lombra and
Torto (1977) for evidence pertinent to the U.S. case.
6. See, for example, Cagan's (1978) review of the billionist controversy in
England in the nineteenth century, and Friedman and Schwartz's (1963)-61-
account of the debate over gold (or bimetallic) standards in the United
States.
7. This idea was familiar in a less formal way earlier on, however. For
example, the debate between Friedman and Meiselman (1963, 1965) and Ando
and Modigliani (1965a, 1965b), over the relative stability of the
money-income and investment-multiplier relations, was clearly in part about
the usefulness of money as a target of monetary policy, although neither
side expressed the issues in Poole's terms of IS and LM curve variances.
See also Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1967, 1969) and the papers in Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (1969) for key pre-1970 contributions.
8. These conventions of notation --allconstants set to zero, lower-case
variables in logarithmic form and interpreted as deviations from
equilibrium values, all coefficients non-negative --willbe maintained
throughout the paper.
9. If a2 —a2—0,the problem is trivial and either instrument implies
E(y2) —0.
10. See Tobin (1983) for a useful intuitive discussion along these lines.
11. For examples of applications to these specific contexts see Aizenmann and
Frenkel (1985), Gray (1976) and Fischer (l977b).
12. Sargent and Wallace also demonstrated that under rational expectations the
real interest rate is invariant with respect to such-62-
choice of m.
13. Standard references on this subject include Modigliani (1963)and Patinkin
(1965). Although the more recent literature hasfocused on explicit (and
analytically tractable) rigidities like contracts specifyingfixed nominal
wages, it is more plausible to regard wageand price rigidities of a more
implicit nature as pervasive throughout the economy; see,for example,
Fischer (1980)
14. To recall, all constants are suppressed, so that (21) gives equilibrium
values stated as percentage deviations around the corresponding
deterministic values that would obtain with z —0.
15. Alternatively, if the zero-mean property of z were taken to imply Ei




16. Fischer (1985) used a similar model assuming —1and 9 —0to argue that
the optimal money supply policy is unresponsive to supply disturbances,but
that result is clearly a special case. For more general values of and
9, may be positive or negative.
17.In other words, the solution shown here rests on the assumption that the
three disturbances are independent.
18. As is familiar, in both cases r —0shields x from any disturbance to money-63-
demand while m —0exposes x to the money demand disturbance but damps the
spending disturbance.
19. Alternatively, the assumption .2 —mn{1S .2d} would lead to a criterion
that switched according to 2d
20. The role of rigid nominal wages in providing this impediment to equilibrium
(and hence a source of policy non-neutrality) makes clear the intimate
connection between the problem of choosing a monetary policy instrument
with the degree of wage indexation (here zero) taken as given, and the
problem of choosing a wage indexation system with the conduct of monetary
policy taken as given. This equivalence is explicit, for example,in Karn
(1983), Aizenmann and Frenkel (1986) and Turnovsky (1987).
21. For example, Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1972,1976and elsewhere) have
consistently taken this approach.
22. To be strictly accurate, what economists usually construe asnonborrowed
reserves (or the nonborrowed monetary base) is not a quantitydirectly set
by the central bank either. In the United States,for example, such
technical factors as float, Treasury deposits at Federal ReserveBanks,
Federal Reserve holdings of foreign currencies, gold flows,and accounts ot
foreign central banks all stand between the economist's conceptand the
quantity directly altered by the Federal Reserve'ssecurities transactions
Moreover, economists almost always refer to nonborrowedreserves on a
seasonally adjusted basis, and on a basis adjusted toreflect changes in
reserve requirements. Omitting such matters fromattention in a survey-64-
like this reflects the usual presumption that, over whatever is the minimum
timehorizon that matters for macroeconomic purposes, the central bank can
successfully offset such factors to within a tolerance sufficient to allow
analysts outside the central bank to neglect them altogether.
23. As in the Poole analysis reviewed in Section I, in general the policy that
minimizes the variance of income is to supply reserves with some non-zero
yet finite elasticity.
24. Jith zero expectations for all three disturbances, the policy consistent
with E(m) —0would be just r —0or h —0.
25. Specifically, the variance E1(y) that follows from (35) or (36) is in
general greater than the corresponding variance given in (37) or (38),
respectively.
- .Aplausible reason is that the analytical shortcomings of using money as an
intermediate target variable were already known before the use of
supply-demand models for the analysis of monetary policy issues became
widespread.
27. Hall's (1984) work, discussed below, makes this concept explicit; some
proponents of nominal income targeting appear to have based their advocacy
of the idea on just this notion. Others, like Tobin (1983) and McCallum
(1984), have relied more on the stochastic structure of aggregate supply
behavior. See the discussion below.-65-
28.If the expectations of all disturbances are zero, then r —0or h —0
implies E(p) —E(x+p)—0,and targeting prices or nominal income is
indistinguishable from any other kind of policy.
29. The usual interpretation of an aggregate demand function like (41) is as a
solved-out IS-LM system. If the underlying spending and money demand
relations are as in (8) and (9), then (apart from price expectations)





for the endogeneity of money as in the analysis above based on the
demand-only model would require writing (41) as x —(61h
-p)+e,which




where now— ande — Useof
either version, of course, presumes that the central bank does not choose r
as the policy instrument.
30. The minimum value 2 is in general non-zero because of the white-noise
components of z and e, and the one-period innovations to the randomwalk
components of z and e.
31. Bean did not consider the further problem associated with the endogeneity
of most plausible definitions of "money." See again footnote 29.
32. West's result is both necessary and sufficient, while Bean's is merely
sufficient, because of the simpler structure of West's model. Insteadof
(14), West used the aggregate supply function in (10), with adaptive price
expectations as the device rendering monetary policy non-neutral. (West-66-
showed that it is the difference in objective, not the difference in supply
behavior, which accounts for the difference between his result and Bean's.)
33. See for, example, Cooper and Fischer (1972a, 1972b).
34. Leroy and Waud (1977) made the dynamic nature of this approach still more
explicit by drawing the analogy between the use of an information variable
and Kalman filtering.
35. Tobin (1970) is the classic statement of the objection to money as an
intermediate target based on questions of causation.
36. What remains, of course, is the question of whether the results of
Granger-Sims tests, based on data from a sample in which the central bank
conducted monetary policy under one set of principles, continue to be
pertinent after a change in those principles. See Lucas (1976) and Sims
(1982) for opposing viewpoints on this issue.
37. Hall's (1984) "elastic price standard" is an exception.
38. A further question in this context is why restrict the information
variables to financial ones. Unlike the intermediate target strategy, the
information variable strategy can in general be centered on nonfinancial
variables. Although this point is familiar enough (see, for example, B.
Friedman (1984a)), the literature to date has not explored in a formal way
the possibility of feedback rules based explicitly on nonfinancial sources
of information.-67-
39.It is also straightforward to calculate the optimal elasticity of reserves
supply, analogous to Poole's optimal elasticity of money supply in (6)
that will in general dominate either r —0or h —0.
40. Because systematic monetary policy does not affect real variables in their
model, the only basis for choosing a target value for the money stock is
presumably to influence prices. The basic flaw in the intermediate target
strategy still obtains, however.
41. A possible exception here is the large literature on institutional
arrangements facilitating (more typically, impeding) the coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies. That subject lies beyond the scope of this
survey, however.
42. In most models the same conclusion would hold for the choice of a policy
instrument to affect prices or (with a source of nonneutrality) income.
43. For example, the U.S. case which motivated McCallum and Hoehn's analysis
involved a two-week lag. By contrast, the shortest time period introduced
in macroeconomic discussions along the lines of (8)-(l0) is usually one
calendar quarter, and it is often much longer. Subsequently, the Federal
Reserve System shortened the lag to two days, but this change did not put
an end to analysis of its operations as a lagged reserve requirement; see,
for example, Goodfriend (1984).
44. Even so, given the traditional importance of this subject in both academic
and practical discussions of monetary policy it is surprising how little-68-
literature has arisen examining such potential effects. Two exceptions are
Johnson (1981) and Friedman (1982b).
45. See also Higgins (1982), Radecki (1984) and Lane (1984).
46. Thebasicpoint here is related to Lucas' (1976) criticism of economic
policymaking based on econometric models, but here it is more general in
form in that what changes is private agents' information sets. A more
direct application of Lucas' point is Walsh's (1984) analysis of the
consequences of the choice of instrument variable for money demand
behavior.
47. In other words, no nominal rigidity provides a source of nonneutrality like
that considered in Sections 1 and II.
48. See, for example, the discussion among B. Friedman (1984b), M. Friedman
(1984) and McCallum (1984).
49. Conceptual antecedents of this procedure are Reuber (1964) and Friedlaender
(1973). The switch to upper-case notation here reflects the fact that
variables are not necessarily in logarithms, and do not necessarily bear
the interpretation of deviations from deterministic base values.
50. For references to many of the specific contributions over the years, see
again Cagan (1982) and McCallum (1985).
51.See, for example, the papers cited by Judd and Scadding (1982) and, more-69-
recently, Roley (1985).
52.See, for example, Pindyck and Roberts (1976).
53. See, for example, the empirical evidence presented by Simpson et al. (1979)
insupport of the Federal Reserve System's 1980 redefinition of the U.S.
monetary aggregates.
54. Again see the review of these issues in Stanley Fischer's contribution to
this Handbook.-70-
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